Introduction
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a composite state, which consists of a European part and a Caribbean part. In the following the European part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will be re ferred to as "the Netherlands", and the two Caribbean areas will be referred to as respectively "Aruba" and the "Netherlands Antilles". Each of the three entities is Although the main object of this article is to deal with financial relations, a meaning ful discussion of the subject has to be preceded by an outline of the constitutional relations between the three Countries under the Charter (= section 2). In section 3 the intergovernmental financial relationship in the Kingdom will be explored. In section 4 some comparative notes will be made, comparing this intergovernmental financial relationship with the one in federal states.
Constitutional relations
In the preamble of the Charter a new constitutional order in the Kingdom of the Netherlands is announced. In this new order the three countries conduct their internal interests autonomously and their common interests on a basis of equality.
To this definition is added a general commitment to accord each other assistance.
As regards its structure the Kingdom is sometimes classified as a pseudo-federal one.
The division of powers between the Kingdom and the countries, as laid down in the Charter, gives rise to such classification. Being part of the Kingdom does not prevent the overseas countries to be a member of a multilateral organisation in their own right. (Art. 28) The treaty by which such membership is realised, has to be signed or adhered to by the Kingdom Government.
Apart from the fixed list of "affairs of the Kingdom" the Charter presents a list of subjects for voluntary consultation and co-operation between the three countries. This article has never been implemented.
As regards the institutional set-up of the Kingdom, each country has its own council of Ministers, its own legislature and judicial organisation.
There is no separate central authority in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Instead, a two-cap-construction of the Netherlands Government has been introduced. The Netherlands cabinet fills the role of Kingdom Government and is supplemented by permanent representatives of the overseas countries (the so-called Ministers plenipo tentiary) when "affairs of the Kingdom" are on the agenda. The cabinet is only to meet in this composition when the matter under discussion also actually touches upon the interests of one or both of the overseas countries (Art. 10,1), or when the legislation under consideration is meant to be actually implemented in Aruba and/or the Netherlands Antilles. So, not only the formal definition of the matter is decisive to classify it as a Kingdom-issue; added thereto there has to be an actual interest of the matter for one of the overseas countries.
The Minister plenipotentiary may oppose a decision by the Kingdom cabinet that he thinks detrimental to his country. Deliberations on the subject will then continue in a reduced reconciliation committee of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom.
A Minister plenipotentiary may only be overruled when the exclusion of his country in the matter to be regulated, could be inconsistent with partnership in the Kingdom.
(Art. 12,1) A straightforward veto-power is given to the overseas countries when they object to being bound by an international economic or financial agreement that, The highest judicial power in the Kingdom is lodged in the High Court of the Nether lands, which is the court of cassation in the Kingdom in civil and penal law cases. This change of perspective also brought about a break in the practice of just summa rily examining the project-proposals drafted by the overseas authorities before grant ing them the financial assistance. A stepping up of actual co-operation had to accom pany the grants. Donor and recipient had to commit themselves to the details of the project.
Financial relations
The new policy gave rise to a substantial increase of technical assistance.
A certain tension between the concept of autonomy, as practised so far, and the in tensive co-operation aimed at under the new policy could be foreseen. The reports also held policy-recommendations concerning financial assistance 12.
It also became clear that the financial situation of Aruba differed substantially from the one in the Netherlands Antilles.
As from 1986 Aruba has successfully concentrated on the tourist industry. The gov ernment of Aruba introduced a National Development Plan in 1991 by which also the Netherlands financial assistance got on firmer ground. Economic growth of Aruba in the period 1986 -1995 rose to an average of 7,6% annually. Its per capita income was $17.700 in 1995 13and increased since then to $ 28.000. The country belongs to the most prosperous countries in the Caribbean.
As regards Aruba the prospect of financial self-reliance does exist. On 11 March 1999 it has been agreed between the Netherlands and Aruba that over a period of 10 years an amount of $218 mil. is to be made available by the Netherlands Govern ment to put Aruba's finances on a healthy basis in accordance with IMF criteria. Out of this amount also the existing debts to the Netherlands government have to be paid14. So, in the year 2010 Aruba will, probably, be financially self-reliant.
As regards the Netherlands Antilles the abovementioned reports underlined that one of the main defects that undermined the effectiviness of the Netherlands financial assistance was the delay in drafting a comprehensive development plan by its gov ernment. The Wawoe-report underlined that the Netherlands Antilles will remain financially dependent if it does not organise itself so as to end the critical economic and financial situation 15.
The expertise of the IMF was invoked to repair this situation. As a result the Gov ernment of the Netherlands Antilles agreed on 10 May 1997 to a Structural Adapta tion Plan aimed at a financial reorganisation of the country. On that day it signed a Memorandum on Economic Policies drafted with the IMF that also monitors the im plementation of it.
In January 1998 the Netherlands Government linked up with this development in a letter to the Netherlands Parliament setting out future policy16.
In the letter the Government expressed its opinion that stricter guarantees had to be created for an effective use of the financial assistance made available to the overseas countries. In accordance with the abovementioned Structural Adaptation Plan she put first priority on the reduction of the budget deficit of the Netherlands Antilles gov ernment. She made her financial assistance dependent on concrete progress in this respect.
Moreover, the Netherlands Government wanted the annual high-level consultations about the financial assistance in future to be held on the basis of elaborated pro grams. Financial assistance had to be switched from projects to programs, in first instance to programs in the social-economic field. By that time the amount for (co-) financing projects in this latter category totalled 36% of all financial assistance to both countries. In the letter assistance for projects promoting "good governance" was expressly ex cluded from program assistance. In an earlier budget statement17 the Government of the Netherlands had declared that in her opinion the Kingdom as such has a respon sibility of its own in this field. In the January-letter she specified the subjects she was thinking of in this connection. It mentioned co-operation in the field of the administration and local government, security, maintenance of the order of law and duties in the field of matters concerning the Kingdom as a whole, like the coastal guard and criminal investigation. Co-operation concerning these subjects would have to remain organized by way of projects. Thus the duties and rights of the parties in each project may be defined in detail. The letter recommends that especially the commitments on projects of "good governance" are approved on cabinet level. The principal purpose of the policy defined therein is the promotion of financial self reliance of the two Caribbean countries.
In the document the Netherlands Government admits that the financial co-operation under the Charter had resulted in certain dominance by the Netherlands authorities in decisions concerning investment in the Netherlands Antilles and on Aruba. This had diminished the effectiveness of the co-operation.
The Netherlands Government confirmed its intention to follow a program-approach for co-financing the development of the two countries instead of its former support of specific projects. It wanted to entrust the funds, which she would transfer, to inde pendently operating development banks.
Moreover, it established 4 priorities on which the co-operation will be concentrated: good governance, sustainable economic development, education, the maintenance of the order of law and human rights.
The two overseas governments would decide on the projects to be initiated under the program and be responsible for their implementation. The Antillean and Aruba au thorities had to submit their requests for co-financing to the independent develop ment bank, which would make the money available under the conditions defined in the regulations for the bank. The regulations had to be drafted in agreement between the Netherlands and the overseas authorities. It was assumed that political tampering with the allocation of the money could thus be prevented as much as possible.
The fourth priority would be excepted from the program approach. Co-operation in that field would only be continued by way of projects. This sector of co-operation represents at the moment about 12% of the value of ongoing projects.
The introduction of the revised format of financial co-operation and the provision of new financial means would be dependent on two conditions i.e. sound financial pol icy based on international standards and on sound governance. The Netherlands An tilles' government had to create in both aspects a new situation, which offered suffi cient guarantee for an effective financial co-operation.
The conditions of the co-operation being thus defined by the Netherlands Govern ment, the judgement about the progress made towards those international standards is left to the IMF. 
Comparative notes
In the above it is indicated how the intergovernmental financial relationship in the Kingdom of the Netherlands has an impact on the autonomous status of the overseas composite parts of the Kingdom. In order to underline the characteristics of this in tergovernmental relationship a few comparative notes will follow comparing this relationship with the practice in federal states. So, it is not the degree of prosperity in the Netherlands itself that is setting the crite rion for the volume of assistance needed to equalise more or less prosperity in the three countries of the Kingdom. The criterion is set by the standards developed by foreign bodies, i.e. international organisations, and based on their experiences and observations in the same region.
C. In federal constitutional constructions the concept of equalisation of finan cial capacity is carried by the idea of the integration of the component states into the federal structure.
In the intergovernmental financial relations between the partners in the Kingdom the motive of integration is lacking. The strictly autonomous powers attributed by the Charter to the countries in the monetary, financial and economic policy fields are indicative in this question. Actually, the Netherlands, being one of the equal partners in the Kingdom, is more integrated in these fields with the Member-States of the European Union than with its Kingdom-partners. This situation also seems to prevent the Kingdom to develop into a "real" federation. For this would imply an extension of the territorial scope of the Treaty on the European Union over non-European terri tory. It is very doubtful that all EU Member States would agree to such extension.
D.
In federal states the amounts to be redistributed among the states are estab lished by an act of the federal legislature, which includes the approval of (a house representing) the states.
The volume of financial assistance by the Netherlands to Aruba and to the Nether lands Antilles is determined by the Netherlands Parliament when giving its approval to the annual budget of the Netherlands Government. The Netherlands Government is then free to spend the money for the purpose as she sees fit. The approval is given by way of a Netherlands Act.
E. In a federal state the ratio between the totals of respectively the specific grants and the general-purpose grants might be taken as an indication of the measure of autonomy that a component state is allowed to exercise. The amount of general-purpose grants tends generally to be the larger of the two categories of grants.
The financial co-operation in the Kingdom of the Netherlands consists for far its greater part of specific grants. This seems in contrast with the frequent statements Netherlands government about her recognition of the autonomy of the two overseas countries. The announced swing from project-aid to program-support reduces this contrast only marginally.
F. Concluding remarks
• Both Caribbean countries are at the moment financially more dependent on the Netherlands than in colonial times22.
• The institutions of intergovernmental financial relations in the Kingdom of the Netherlands show no parallelism with those in federal states.
• The intergovernmental financial relationship in the Kingdom of the Netherlands has grown into a major determinant in the constitutional set-up of the Kingdom. 
